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Filippo Brunelleschi built a perspective device that combined a
rendering of the Florence baptistery with a mirror. Its story is one of
the origin myths of the art and science of perspectival projection—
of what the Florentine renaissance called costruzzione leggitima.
Brunelleschi painted a small picture of the Florentine baptistery,
which is located directly opposite the entrance of the Florentine
cathedral. This picture and the accompanying apparatus were to
provide a demonstration of a new technique, which we now call
perspective. But Brunelleschi wanted his picture not just to show
this technique, but also to demonstrate its accuracy, its special
ability to put objects in space and in correct relation to one another.
So he provided the beholder an apparatus that would permit each
beholder to demonstrate to himself the validity of Brunelleschi’s
technique.
Brunelleschi drilled a small hole in the painted panel, so the
beholder could look through the hole at the mirror and see the
perspective construction in the mirror. The apparatus, including the
painting and the mirror, was small, which allowed the beholder to
hold it easily, and even to hold it at the very place—a point three

braccia inside the door of the Florentine cathedral opposite the
baptistery—from which the view was projected (fig. 1).

Fig. 1: Speculative recreation of Brunelleschi’s perspective device
Now, regardless of where the picture was seen, it would have
offered a convincing likeness of the baptistery. Furthermore, the
mirror might have enhanced the beholder’s experience of the
panel’s verisimilitude, regardless of where this device might have
been used. But, used at precisely the right place, just inside the
doors of the cathedral, it would have done something crucially
different. Restricted to a single eye’s point of view and aided by the
mirror, the beholder could have judged the conformity of the image
in the painting to the view of the baptistery available from that
privileged point of view. The picture was an example of the new
technique of perspectival projection; the apparatus was a device for
proving the technique’s claim.
In his discussion of this device, Hubert Damisch aligns the painting
with “showing” and the mirror with “demonstrating.”1 The painting
shows the baptistery and some part of the surrounding square. The
mirror, on the other hand, makes nothing new visible. It only shows
the painted scene in relation to the real place. Rather than offer a
new prospect, it does something called demonstrating, which
Damisch understands in the sense of demonstrating the truth of a
theorem or the guilt or innocence of an accused person. The mirror
establishes the truth of the painting’s claim. But, and this is a crucial
point, it can only do so for a single eye that occupies a particular
point, which is determined rigorously by the perspectival

projection. Perhaps it is worth noting that Brunelleschi’s device is
constructed in terms of the user’s body, and specifically in terms of
braccia—a measure derived from the length of the forearm. Thus,
the panel is just over half a braccia square. The mirror is to be held
at an arm’s length—at one braccia—and at a point precisely three
braccia inside the door of the cathedral. It is as if Brunelleschi’s
apparatus were a machine for extending a rationalized abstraction
of the human arm throughout the modules of a grid that carried to
infinity the body of the beholder.
Damisch compares the function of the mirror in Brunelleschi’s
apparatus with the mirror in Jan van Eyck’s Arnolfini picture (Damisch,
129-31). Referring to Erwin Panofsky’s thesis that the picture fulfills
the function of a legal document, Damisch points to the famous
signature—“Jan van Eyck was here”—and its conjunction with the
mirror as something similar to the evidentiary structure in
Brunelleschi’s apparatus. Both locate the subject at a precise
position and do so for the more or less literally legal purpose of
demonstrating their relation to a place, to a situation. Of course, in
this, it is also unlike Brunelleschi’s apparatus, since one needn’t
maintain a specified position. I think this is significant, so I will return
to it presently.

Fig. 2 (left): Jan van Eyck, The Arnolfini Portrait, 1434, National Gallery,
London; with Fig. 3 (right): detail
First, let us ask: How will all of this help us understand Joan Miró’s
politics? He did not use costruzzione leggitima or anything much like it.
Few modernists did. Nevertheless, Damisch heaps scorn on the
idea that perspective’s reign ended in modernism (Damisch, 35ff).
This is part of his general rethinking of the notion of perspective’s
history as a trajectory from origin to demise. Rather than ask

whether this age or that culture used perspective, he asks instead
what perspective they had (Damisch, 12-13). Accordingly, to take
one example, he recuperates the multiple viewpoints of postCézannian painting for an enlarged notion of perspective by
invoking a collection of miniature cones of vision, each cast
eccentrically like a glance or a stare from a mobile subject
(Damisch, 35-37) (figs. 2 and 3). But this continuation of perspective
leaves aside the question of the mirror—of the literal mirror, of
Brunelleschi’s mirror. The regime, as it were, of Brunelleschi’s
demonstration surely has a history of its own in modernism.
Perhaps Juan Gris’s Le Lavabo, with its fragment of mirror, could be
seen this way. But without doubt, Brunelleschi’s apparatus
continues itself in minimalism.

Fig. 4 (left): Georges Braque, Fruit Dish and Glass, 1912, priv. coll., and
fig. 5 (right): Abraham Bosse, Les Perspecteurs, from the Manière
universelle de M. Desargues pour traitor la perspective, 1648

Fig. 6: Juan Gris, Le Lavabo, 1912, priv. coll.
Like the apparatus that requires the observer to place him or herself
in the doorway of the cathedral, the minimalist or literalist work
creates a situation, oriented toward the presence of a beholder,
which is completed by the presence of the beholder. Like the
mirror image, one might say, the minimalist situation does not exist
until someone occupies the situation it affords.2

Fig. 7: Tony Smith, Die, 1962, Whitney Museum of American Art, New
York
Further, and again like the mirror, on Damisch’s Lacanian account, it
breaks the beholder into a seeing eye, on one hand, and a
conjunction of surfaces, on the other, which the subject cannot fully
reconcile with each other. Thus the apparatus forces the subject
into a dialogue of perspectives and gazes (Damisch, 46-47). This
subject sees and is to be seen. The work and the politics that
succeed this development, this minimalist moment, only focus
more insistently on making—or affording—the beholder a place, a
position, a subject position, to use the official term. Hence the political
dimension of much post-mimimalist work. More specifically, we are
speaking of the politics of visibility, of identity. Think of Adrian
Piper’s Hypothesis Series (1968-69), which combines a literal charting of
the artist’s position in space with accounts of the experiences and
identities of those she encounters.3

Fig. 8: Adrian Piper, Hypothesis: Situation #3 (for Sol LeWitt), 1968,
Adrian Piper Research Archive
One might object that, like van Eyck’s mirror, Piper’s Hypothesis Series
bore witness to her presence and did not specify a place for the
beholder who reads and observes the documentation that present
the work. But that would be to misunderstand the project. The

Hypothesis Series, Piper explains, “acknowledges the perspectival
character of human perception, by charting and documenting my
navigation through space and time as myself a moving or stationary
object with the capacity for sensory perception and the ability to
self-consciously register those perspectival perceptions at fixed
intervals. Thus the shift in perspective that characterizes this project
implicitly introduces issues of subjectivity, personal identity, selfknowledge, self-objectification and difference.” Thus the
representation she makes, of, say, the single mother who is her
colleague and whose struggle with her Italian-American identity
intrigues Piper, is meant, like Brunelleschi’s little picture of the
baptistery, to give you an opportunity to match Piper’s
representation against your own viewpoint. The proof of the
pudding, so to speak, is still in the mirror.
The political alternative will emerge—paradoxically, given the
similarity Damisch sees between van Eyck’s picture and
Brunelleschi’s apparatus—from van Eyck’s picture. Its mirror is only
a painted image, not a real mirror. Consequently, the mirror
reflection in it is not a demonstration; rather, it makes or supports a
claim, like an “affidavit,” at least on the reading (Panofsky’s reading)
that Damisch engages. Certainly, the circumstances and subject of
the painting are other than precisely as Panofsky understood them,
and it is hardly my aim to support his reading. For the present
purposes, it is enough that the signature be understood to attest to
the presence the mirror evidences. “Jan van Eyck was here 1434” is
the claim; the images in the painted mirror—presumably those of
the artist and an unnamed companion—affirm its truth, rather then

demonstrate it. They function like a signature, not a real mirror. And
the juxtaposition and comparison to a signature are very much to
the point. The image in the mirror, on this famous account, would
need to show two figures because, as Damisch explains, legal
protocol requires two, not one, to be present (Damisch, 130-31). And
it does show two; a fact that is mirrored, so to speak, in another
difference between van Eyck’s picture and Brunelleschi’s apparatus:
the picture can bear witness to two or more beholders
simultaneously. It is public. That is necessary because—as
Panofsky argues—van Eyck’s picture functions legally; it emerges
from and participates in civic life. In fact, Panofsky specifically
points out that witnesses were not required for a valid marriage
ceremony in the Church’s view. These witnesses were not the
Church’s requirement, but the law’s.4 Thus the demonstration van
Eyck’s mirror makes is specifically of the political realm, not the
theological. And because its power derives from a claim—that Jan
van Eyck and another legal subject bore witness for the Arnolfinis—
and because its mirror image’s testimony is the same for everyone,
regardless of who looks at the picture and where, the beholder’s
position does not matter as it did for the user of Brunelleschi’s
apparatus. In fact, as is the case for any legal document, once
signed and executed among its parties and its witnesses and the
proper authorities, the reader’s position—his subject position, her
identity—does not matter at all. But, then, neither does what he or
she sees. As Wlad Godzich explains, ancient Greece drew a
distinction between those individuals who were qualified to bear
witness, who constituted a theoria, and the population at large.
Anyone might witness an event of political importance, but only a

theoros had the authority to put “into socially acceptable and reliable
language” what he saw.5 Hence, we are shown what van Eyck saw.
What we see does not matter, has no authority. Godzich blames the
demise of this system on philosophers, who “came along and
attempted to ground everything in sense perception, in aesthesis”
(Godzich, xv). Of course, by now, we have come to think of this—this
refusal to submit our quest for truth to external authority—as a
feature of modernity, and of freedom.6
So we have two modes of politics. One that depends on your
subject position and one that doesn’t. And we have two kinds of art:
one that depends on your subject position and one that doesn’t.
And they align themselves, one with the other, according to what
they assume about representation and about truth. Which kind of
art is Miró’s? Or is it another kind altogether? And what kind of
politics does it embody?
In the context of a recent exhibition devoted to the question of
Miró’s politics, Robert Lubar explained nicely the difficulties the

exhibition faced:

To chart Miró’s relationship with the changing tides of political Catalanism
in these early years is a difficult undertaking. Although he was notoriously
reluctant to declare a partisan position, his sympathies were undoubtedly
on the left of the political spectrum, as his later commitment to the cause
of the Spanish Republic demonstrates. His early letters are filled with
enthusiasm for the international aspirations of Catalan culture, yet he
repeatedly registered disdain for the political establishment and the
willful ignorance of the recalcitrant bourgeoisie in his homeland.7

Or, similarly: “If political events and social movements were the
engine behind his art—the very fact of his Catalan national
sentiment unequivocally attests to this—that relationship was highly
mediated” (Lubar, 37). Lubar goes on to see the ambiguous (but
indubitable) presence of this Catalan national sentiment behind
Miró’s Head of a Catalan Peasant series of 1924-25 (Lubar, 38).
Ultimately, Lubar proposes we describe the embodiment of Miró’s
political position in terms borrowed from Jacques Rancière. Lubar
cites a short passage from Rancière’s essay “Aesthetics as Politics”
(which stemmed from a seminar held in Barcelona under the
auspices of the Museu d’Art Contemporani) that deserves to be
repeated here:

Art is not, in the first instance, political because of the messages and
sentiments it conveys concerning the state of the world. Neither is it
political because of the manner in which it might choose to represent
society’s structures, or social groups, their conflicts or identities. It is
political because of the very distance it takes with respect to these
functions, because of the type of space and time that it institutes, and the
manner in which it frames this time and peoples this space.8

Today, Rancière goes on to explain, we tend to see art fulfilling this
political promise in two ways—“the two great politics of aesthetics:
the politics of the becoming-life of art and the politics of the
resistant form” (Rancière, 43-44). He clarifies:

The first identifies the forms of aesthetic experience with the forms of an
other life. The finality it ascribes to art is to construct new forms of life in
common, and hence to eliminate itself as a separate reality. The second,
by contrast, encloses the political promise of aesthetic experience in art’s
very separation, in the resistance of its form to every transformation into a
form of life. (Rancière, 44)

So, the “politics of the becoming-life of art” finds its expression in
“relational” work, in those projects that seek to shape a community

for themselves or to break down the separation between art and life
and transform life into something else by doing so. The latter, the
“politics of the resistant form,” aims to resist becoming relational, to
hold itself apart from ordinary life, to declare independence from
ordinary life, and thereby envision something radically otherwise
(Rancière, 22-24, for instance). Lubar aligns Miró’s art—with special
emphasis on the early years that concern us here—with the “politics
of the ‘resistant form’” (Lubar, 42). And it is in this mode, then, that
his art is politically active.
Lubar would seem to align Miró’s work with the kind of politics the
Arnolfini portrait exemplifies—in which your position doesn’t matter.
But that is not exactly what his appeal to Rancière leads to. Lubar
explains: “For Rancière both art and politics are involved in the
distribution of ‘spaces and times, subjects and objects, the common
and the singular’” (Lubar, 42; citing Rancière, 25). Or, as Rancière also
puts it, art and politics are “linked, beneath themselves, as forms of
presence of singular bodies in a specific space and time” (Rancière,
26).
This thesis, which is tangent to arguments Rancière makes
elsewhere, is open to some criticism.9 For my purposes in this
argument, it is enough to say that I want to question Rancière’s
claim that the “aesthetic regime of art” fulfills its political potential
only as an “autonomous form of experience,” as a “form of sensory
experience” (Rancière, 32). This claim grows out of a desire to
reorient a (modernist) concern with the autonomy of the artwork

away from the context of its making and toward the context of its
actual or empirical place in common experience. I will claim that it
is the achievement and the political importance of Miró’s art of
these years to reveal the limitations of the “sensory experience” of a
situated beholder. In what follows, I will build on the paradigms of
perspective I have introduced with the help of Damisch to test the
hypothesis that a description of Miró’s own mode of perspective will
give us an account of his kind of politics. Ultimately, I shall try to
show, Miró’s work (at least in the period I consider) addresses itself
to a beholder who occupies a position—which is to say that it
shapes a space, as Rancière might put it—, only to show that
beholder that no position is adequate to the task of seeing the work
of art.

Fig. 9: Joan Miró, Nude with Mirror, 1919, Kunstsammlung NordrheinWestfalen, Düsseldorf
Let’s begin early in Miró’s career, with his 1918 Nude with Mirror. I’ll
point out three things about the picture that I consider especially
important. First, Miró has rendered the pattern in the rug and on the
side of the hassock so as to undermine or negate an effect of
recession into depth. The ground plane tips up, and the hassock
flattens out, parallel to the picture plane. Secondly, a loop of
drapery, cubified awkwardly, slightly but pointedly overlaps the
figure’s shoulder. This effect seems to me to qualify that of the
flattening in the rug and hassock, since the overlapping creates at
least the logic of depth and draws the figure into it. Thirdly, the
figure turns the hand mirror, understandably enough, away from the
beholder and toward herself. Given the context into which I’ve
inserted Miró—alongside Brunelleschi and van Eyck—the mirror
seems important. But, and this strikes me as another strongly
marked choice of Miró’s, the nude figure’s face does anything but
imply that she looks at the mirror. This curious choice joins the loop
of cubified curtain in causing, I want to say, the space to close up or
even to turn in on itself. That’s what a mirror does: turn space back
to face itself. But unlike either Brunelleschi’s mirror or van Eyck’s,
this mirror faces away from the beholder, and turns space away
from that beholder. The figure’s lowered eyelids then render its
demonstration moot.

Fig. 10: Joan Miró, Standing Nude, 1921, priv. coll.
This 1921 Standing Nude invites parallel observations. The space is
once again flattened, by the anti-perspectival rendering of the
proscenium the figure stands on and by the flat black frame that
encloses her. But her figure is rendered in a quirky combination of
representational modes that includes effects of volume. Her right
arm is clearly modelled, for instance. Further, it implies and as it
were embraces a certain deep space insofar as it points outward
and folds back on itself. This isn’t the deep space of perspectival
projection that opens up a void in which to dispose bodies, but a
more intimately physical space, which is opened up by a body and
which ends at the limits of that body’s reach. In several ways, the
figure confirms my hypothesis. For example, right where the hand
should be, a set of lines like rays emerge from the figure’s wrist and
disappear behind her shoulder. It’s as if the figure’s volume were to
be measured in the distance that elbow pressed forward and
outward from the graphic space just behind her shoulder, the space
to which her body returns where her hand vanishes. The figure’s
other hand is no less remarkable or important. She holds it out in

front of her—again, extending the body’s space outward—and turns
her hand back toward herself, differently from the way the figure’s
right hand does, but to analogous effect; that is, turning the hand
back on itself closes or encloses the space the body claims. In fact,
because she holds the hand out from herself and because she
ambiguously appears to look at it, I want to compare it to the hand
in the earlier Seated Nude that holds the hand mirror.
I would also point out another feature of this hand—specifically, that
it is evidently a right hand. So maybe one would say it is in some
sense a mirror image, reversed to face the figure in the painting. Or,
one might rather say that there is a sense in which the figure itself
should be thought of as both facing outward and as turning around,
into the picture. Fundamentally, the two possibilities aren’t so
different. Either way, the figure faces out of the picture and turns
into the picture, too. Obviously, as an account of the picture’s mode
of perspectival projection, this raises more questions than it
answers. Perhaps we should understand it, as we have understood
the mirrors we’ve seen elsewhere, to register the presence of a
space outside the picture (such as that in which van Eyck and his
companion stood or that in which the holder of Brunelleschi’s
apparatus stood) to the scene pictured in it.

Fig. 11: Joan Miró: Catalan Landscape (The Hunter), 1923-24, Museum
of Modern Art, New York
The central figure of Catalan Landscape of about two years later can
be understood similarly. I see it as an important instance of Miró
transforming an early motif—in this case, the figure that faces
outward and inward simultaneously—as his larger pictorial
strategies change.10 The figure of the hunter faces out of the
picture, but his hat does something I want to claim orients it into the
picture, in something like the way the reversed hand mirror can be
thought of as orienting the reflected face of the seated nude into

the picture. I say that because the hat is connected to, tangent to
and repeated in spectral bands, which lead in turn to a passing
comet. In fact, the crown of the hunter’s hat is dotted, like the bands
that emanate from it to touch the comet, as if to underscore their
identity against the obvious differences between a hat and
atmospheric or celestial phenomena. But that very distinction—
between the near and the far—is precisely what Miró seems to have
been determined to elide.

Fig. 12: Joan Miró, Head of a Catalan Peasant, 1924, National Gallery of
Art, Washington, D.C.
Other works of the 1920s develop this theme, too. The National
Gallery of Art’s own Head of a Catalan Peasant of 1924, for instance,
centers on a figure reduced to little more than the cross-axial lines
and barretina we saw in the hunter-figure in Catalan Landscape. Just
beside the figure, a set of colored lines denotes a rainbow, while a
star comes almost to settle on the figure’s left cross-member. In
1972, Rosalind Krauss offered a reading of the lines of such
schematic cross-axial figures, one component of which centrally
concerns us here: her suggestion that the horizontal cross-member,
which we can read as the arms of a stick figure, can also be read as

the horizon that defines the limit of deep pictorial space, Miró’s way
of uniting the near to the far, the space of the body to the vastness
of earth and sky.11 Thus I want to point to the curving crown of the

barretina to note that it is colored in, as if to mark, albeit in a different
way from the one we saw in Catalan Landscape, the hat’s changing
status as it passes from contact with the body to a silhouette
projected against the sky.
Finally, note the two constellations of dots—one in the upper left
corner of the picture and one in the lower right. They are very small
and difficult to see in reproduction. In fact, in reproduction it is
virtually impossible to see that, in making the dots, Miró has pierced
the canvas in the lower right quadrant. Perhaps it is his way of
making literal or, so to speak, sculptural, the effect the picture most
forcefully evokes, at least in my mind: the effect of rendering
available to vision the transition from the physically immediate to a
separate space, some kind of beyond.
Of course, to see those little holes it’s actually necessary to get
pretty close to the canvas and look carefully. The same kind of
close inspection seems like the right way to approach the small
dots in the upper left of the canvas, as well. And I don’t think this is
a trivial fact about them. As is widely noted, Miró spoke as early as
1918 to his friend J.F. Ràfols of his

Joy [as Miró put it] at learning to understand a tiny blade of grass in a
landscape. Why belittle it?—a blade of grass is as enchanting as a tree or
a mountain.—Apart from the primitives and the Japanese, almost
everyone overlooks this which is so divine.—Everyone looks for and paints
only the huge masses of trees, of mountains, without hearing the music
of blades of grass and little flowers and without paying attention to the
tiny pebbles of a ravine—enchanting.12

This early passage does more than show Miró’s awareness of the
mesmerizing power a small pictorial element can wield. It also
connects these small details with the scale and distances of
landscape—with mountains and ravines—, rather than with still lifes
and portraits. In other words, Miró puts his fascination with the
small in such a way as to make it clearly part of his relation to the
vastness of space in general. In fact, there are two sides to this
fascination, I think. On one hand, there’s the more explicit sense in
which Miró expresses an attraction to small things in the vast world.
On the other hand, though, there’s another sense in which the small
details seems to have to do with the scale of painting (painting as
he practices it, which is to say, easel painting). The brute quality of
the little marks Miró makes on the surface of this painting work, by
resisting easy assimilation to the fictional world of the peasant

figure, to keep both their senses—that is, both their role as tiny
points in the yellow world of the Catalan peasant and their
character as marks on the painted surface—aggressively in view.
And as I’ve said, this goes double for the holes he pokes in the
canvas.

Fig. 13: Joan Miró, Painting, 1927, Philadelphia Museum of Art,
Philadelphia
That fascination with vastness, which I’m claiming is bound up with
Miró’s attention to the minute, appears again later as a theme when
Miró writes to Pierre Loeb, for instance, of his desire to “have loving

relations, so to speak, with my earth, to lie on the sand and lick this
beautiful sky.”13 It is also a leitmotif of later work. In the 1927 canvas
titled only Painting, Miró shows more dots—red mixed with yellow,
this time—scattered on a white patch that mostly corresponds to
the area of a roughly drawn rectangle. The rectangle itself is
transfixed by two rays emanating from near the left edge of the
canvas. Altogether, the scene resembles nothing more closely than
it does the famous pyramid of Albertian perspective, unless it is
taken to resemble projection in a cinema. So again, the little points
Miró renders assume their place in a model of beholding, one which
we could call generically by the name “projection,” and in which the
subject looks into a scene that has a sort of directionality—a scene
that is, as the word “projection” implies, thrown forth, away from
him. One way to read the picture, then, is as a sort of illustration of
the image as projection. Taken in a large sense of projection, that
could be about the way an easel painting can picture vastness as a
kind of recession or projection away from the beholder—as in
perspectival projection. The dots, then, would once again be
playing their old role as markers of vast or even celestial distance—

like stars in the sky. Further, since Miró has opposed this projected
scene to his characteristically tiny signature, the latter strikes me as
doing double service in the picture: as the position of the beholder
in the diagram of beholding, tiny before the projected vastness; but
on the other hand, also keying the actual beholder in to an
opposition of scale between the signature, which is, after all,
understandable as a feature of the painting rather than of the fictional
world it pictures, and the painting’s size—an opposition that invites
the beholder to come close, or at least to imagine doing so, and to
register the relative vastness of the framed expanse of the canvas.
Now, as Félix Fanès has recently emphasized, Miró’s references to
popular and particularly cinematic culture toward the end of the
1920s owe much to his association with Michel Leiris and the circle
around the dissident-surrealist journal Documents.14 That journal was
published in 1929 and 1930, but Leiris’s association with Miró goes
back to 1922, and Leiris’s interest in motion pictures, and in
projection generally, dates to around the same time.
In fact, the first reference Leiris makes to the experience of cinema
in his private journal is an account of a dream, rather than a note on
an actual motion picture viewing. In the dream Leiris recorded the
sixteenth of March, 1923, he describes himself, dead, looking at a
sky filled with dust “like,” as he puts it, “a theater outside the
projector’s ray.” He continues:

Many luminous globes, of a milky white, were lined up in the depths of
the sky; from each of them came a long metallic wire, and one of them
pierced my chest through without my feeling anything but a great
beatitude. I advanced toward the globes of light by sliding along the
length of the wire, and I held the hands of other men who rose like me
toward the sky, each following the rail that perforated his flesh. One
heard no noise but the light squealing of the steel on our chests.15

To paraphrase Leiris a little: one might say the dream takes
projection as a model of space, then turns it into a story about being
projected into celestial space, to feel one’s distance from it
collapse. That image is not far at all from the experiments Miró
began in 1923 with Catalan Landscape, and it’s closer still to the story
we might tell about the 1927 painting on sized canvas and its scene
of projection.

Fig. 14: Michel Leiris, “L’Appareil à Dédoublement,” journal entry dated
Thursday, October 16, 1924
The following year, Leiris wrote a related journal entry—this one
apparently inspired by a visit to the Musée des Arts et Métiers. On
his visit to the museum, Leiris had seen a “device for learning the
use of perspective” (Leiris, entry for October 15, 1924, 70-71). In the
journal entry for the following day, Leiris turns this apparatus into a
fanciful invention of his own, which he calls “The Doubling Machine”
(“L’Appareil à Dédoublement”). He illustrates the machine with a
diagram and an explanatory legend: “Generative sphere of
medullary rays, owing to the obliqueness of the infra-cosmic mirror.
The subject, projected into a frame with the weight of his matter,
inscribes his double there enlarged and with independent
existence” (Leiris, entry for October 16, 1924, 71).
Leiris’s thought experiment underscores the intimate connection of
projection to scale—and especially to the scale of the sky or the
cosmos. One of the themes Leiris develops at length later, in his
writings for Documents, is that of the relation of the individual,
embodied self to the cosmos, as microcosm and macrocosm.16
That is a much better-known story, so I will just note it and pass over
it here, because I want to return to Miró, but I think it’s important to
note two things: first, the way Miró represents the relation of the
body to the cosmos can be understood as a kind of perspective—as
implying a kind of projection. And second, the way Miró represents
that relation changes around this time—around 1929 and 1930. He
begins to place less emphasis on metaphors or symbols, and to
place greater weight on the literal correspondences between the
beholder’s experience of the picture and experience in general.

Fig. 15: Joan Miró, Portrait of Queen Louise of Prussia, 1929, Meadows
Museum, Southern Methodist University, Dallas
I take this to be a crucial transition, because it relates Miró’s art to a
drive among certain members of the Documents circle toward more
literal, which is to say, less metaphorical, effects.17 In 1929 Leiris said
Miró had left behind his “small equations,” such as, “sun=potato,
slug=small bird, gentleman=moustache, spider=sex, man=soles of
the feet.”18 As an example of the new turn in Miró’s art, Leiris refers
to “the bedroom of the queen of Prussia,” the bareness of which he
says is simple to understand: “the furniture has dissolved in water,
the way my table does sometimes, when I’m tired and my books
and cigarettes turn out to be incapable of beguiling my boredom”
(Leiris 1929, 28). That is, Leiris connects the bareness of Miró’s
special kind of pictorial space very directly to a certain mode of
ordinary experience. He elaborates on the thought:

It is Miró who has expressed this liquefaction, this relentless evaporation
of structures—as relentless as any of the other vicious circles in which I,
and all of creation, turn round and round—this soft leakage of the
substance that makes all things—us, our thoughts, and the setting we live
in—like jellyfish or octopi; he has been the one to express this so
satisfactorily in several of his old canvases and especially in his current
series of

Portraits. (Leiris 1929, 29)

To Leiris’s point about the Queen Louise of Prussia, I’d like to add an
observation or two that will build on themes he and I have already
proposed. First, I would like to note that the figure’s arms are based
on an advertisement for shirt collars,19 and that Miró’s attraction to
the form of the shirt collar owed at least something to the fact that it
turns over on itself, with a tie that crosses like folded arms.

Fig. 16: Advertisements from the April 14, 1929, edition of La Veu de
Catalunya, inscribed by Miró, Fundació Joan Miró, Barcelona

Fig. 17: Joan Miró, Dutch Interior, 1928, Metropolitan Museum of Art,
New York

Fig. 18: Joan Miró, Potato, 1928, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New
York
Like the folded-over arm of the 1921 Standing Nude, I take the arms
crossing each other or crossing the figure’s body to be a way of
letting the body define its space by embracing it. Another version
of this strategy would be that of Miró’s 1928 Dutch Interior in the
Metropolitan Museum of Art, in which the arm, rather than cross
over the body, travels around it in a giant arc, to unite an outwardfacing pose to a turning figure. In The Potato, which shares
preparatory drawings with the reaching arm of the Met’s Dutch Interior,
a drawn line replaces most of the arc of the right arm; meanwhile
the figure’s right hand has apparently migrated to its left arm. The
hand at the end of the left arm is, evidently, a right hand, with its
palm facing away from us. The migrating right hand brings us full
circle, so to speak, back to the Standing Nude.

Fig. 19: Joan Miró, Spanish Dancer, 1928, priv. coll.
A 1928 collage titled Spanish Dancer combines several of these
techniques for rendering and condensing gesture and bodily
volume. As Anne Umland observed to me, the figure is organized
like the cross-axial figures, which may be taken to imply, as we’ve
seen, a double relation between the figure and its space. Similarly,
Rémi Labrusse has discussed the relation of Miró’s dancer theme to
ecstatic identification with the not-self in a short essay on Miró’s
Spanish dancers.20 In this Spanish Dancer, the string that hangs in the
middle of the assemblage, and which originally dangled at the
bottom, with the lower nail loose like a plumb bob, is something like
the vertical that establishes the figure’s upright posture.21 The loose
string, though, would also evoke the possibility of its rotation. That
is, the possibility of the figure turning, like a dancer. I take that
turning, and possibly the arms of the spinning figure, as well, to be
summarized in the loop of string that circles the lower half of the
figure, which renders the movement once again as a contour that
contains the figure.22 The opposition contained in the string’s dual
nature—the opposition between it as an object set over against the
beholder, on one hand, and as a turning into and a turning-to-faceinto the deep space of the fictional world—that opposition

represents the impossible pair of relations I have been finding
throughout Miró’s works. To return that opposition to our larger
question: If the contradictory relations the works project for the
beholder rule out the Brunelleschian mode, so to speak, of political
engagement via subject position, and the specificity of those
relations rule out the universal address of what we might call the
van Eyckian mode, then Miró’s works must demand a different
accounting. If we continue to trace this opposition, we may be able
to supply that account.

Fig. 20: Joan Miró, Collage (Composition with Wire), 1929, priv. coll.

Fig. 21: Joan Miró, Collage, 1929, priv. coll.
A pair of collages from 1929 forcefully demonstrates the two senses
of the loop. Each composition centers on a figure—the shape of
their heads clearly connect them to the Spanish Dancer as well as to

The Potato. The body of each is a vertical band, like the vertical lines
of the cross-axial figures that run through the works of the 1920s. In
one of the 1929 collages, though, a loop of wire circles the figure
like the string that loops around the 1928 Spanish Dancer or the line
that emerges from The Potato’s volcano-breast to reach around its
figure. The other 1929 collage is close in composition to the first,
but in place of its wire loop, a rough disk of flocked paper is
collaged to the drawing, creating a translucent circular space for
the figure. It’s as if Miró has reinterpreted the same shape as both
the gesture of the figure’s arm and as the contour of a volume that
defines or contains the space that gesture claims for the figure.

Fig. 22: Joan Miró, Portrait of La Fornarina, 1929, priv. coll.
Now consider Miró’s Portrait of La Fornarina.23 The upper right-hand
corner of Miró’s painting reveals, on close inspection, about eight
red dots, which float more or less visibily between the figure and
the corner of the painting. As in the examples we saw earlier, I want
to align these dots with projection into the picture, with extension
into deep space. Furthermore, I want to emphasize in this case
more than in the others, that seeing the dots requires a close
examination and an intensity of looking that is considerably greater
even than the Head of a Catalan Peasant in Washington requires.24
Seeing all eight dots means standing close and looking hard.25

Fig. 23: detail of Portrait of La Fornarina
But doing that puts one, it seems to me, at something closer than a
natural viewing distance to the roughly trapezoidal blackish shape
in the lower half of the canvas. That is to say, taking that dark form
in as a distinct shape while straining into the picture to see the red
dots strikes me as nearly impossible. From close-to, that dark area
becomes a formless void, a blind spot that withdraws the lower part
of the figure and of the painting from peripheral vision. I don’t feel
this is an accident. Rather, I feel in this precisely an echo of Leiris’s
remark that the objects in the space of Queen Louise’s bedroom
have “dissolved in water, the way my table does sometimes” (Leiris
1929, 28). Leiris sees the ability to express this dissolution, this
“liquefaction, this relentless evaporation of structure,” as Miró’s
special achievement, particularly in the Imaginary Portraits (Leiris 1929,
28-29). In places like this, Miró seems to excel in converting pictorial
space into an equivalent for an internal or bodily space, which has
no distinct objects in the way the objective space that spreads out
before us does. Of course, the boundaries of that bodily space—its
horizons, one might say—are not clearly defined. Catalan Landscape

teaches that lesson by representing as gradual rather than abrupt
the transitions from the hunter’s head to his barretina to the rainbow
to the comet. The difference—or, a key difference—between Catalan

Landscape and Portrait of La Fornarina is exactly that that lesson goes
from being illustrated by a metaphor—recall Leiris’s list of neat
equations that fall out of Miró’s work—to being demonstrated, in a
much more literal way, by the conditions of viewing the painting
itself stages. Looking at Miró’s Portrait of La Fornarina produces and
relates to each other the experiences of straining at small things
and losing oneself in the painting’s space.

Fig. 24: Joan Miró, Collage, 1929, priv. coll.

Fig. 25 (left): Joan Miró, preparatory drawing for Collage, 1929 (fig. 24);
fig. 26 (right): drawing related to Collage, 1929 (fig. 24), Fundació Joan
Miró, Barcelona
Another 1929 single-figure composition reduces, or distills, the
themes I’ve been discussing and condenses the turning with the
projection I discussed earlier (plate 32). The composition is clearly a
stripped-down revision of the turning figure we saw before in the

Dutch Interior. This one is based on a drawing, which it closely
resembles in composition (F.J.M. 2588, MoMA 2008, page 73, fig. 3).
Another drawing, which shows an array of five dots that correspond
to the dots at the end of the first drawing’s fingers, and which were
apparently generated by the impressions Miró’s left in drawing the
figure’s dotted fingertips, suspends them in the sky (I say that
because they’re above what I take to be a horizon line), like the
projected points we saw earlier. That transformation makes explicit
—perhaps literal would be a better word—the comparison between
the finger-tip limit of the body that embraces its own space and the
projection that throws tiny dots into the vastness of celestial
distance.

Fig. 27: Joan Miró, Object, 1932, Philadelphia Museum of Art,
Philadelphia
Let me close with one more example, taken from a couple of years
later than the works we’ve considered so far. It’s the 1932 Object in
the A.E. Gallatin Collection at the Philadelphia Museum of Art. In his
recent discussion of this work and this period in Miró’s oeuvre,
William Jeffett reveals an emphasis among contemporary
commentators on various ways the corporeal presence or literal
size of the beholder come into play. Miró’s friend Ràfols referred to
works of this period as “corporeal realizations”; Estratios Tériade
glossed their toy-like quality in terms of “big people or . . . children
who have grown up [qui ont grandi] in us”; George Hugnet says these
objects are bereft of fetishism, but that their “symbols grow in size,”
and further that they work as ideograms or “correspondences,” so
that there “are no more comparisons and metaphors.”26 Like
Jeffett, I take these acknowledgements of the role of size and of the
beholder’s own corporeality and the beholder’s size seriously.
Moreover, as I said earlier, I take Miró’s disjunctions of scale to be his
own way of implying projection—as if the children who have grown
up in us are seeing themselves projected in us at some distance, as
if by the medullary rays of Leiris’s fanciful machine for doubling.
Indeed, the 1932 Object feels small, pointedly or emphatically small
—it’s less than six inches tall—, at least partly because it represents
a figure against a field of sequins as the small points I’ve taken
elsewhere to represent celestial motifs, like stars, projected into the
vastness of space. To see this work properly, one must get up
close, as with Miró’s Portrait of La Fornarina. Its smallness works, like
that of Miró’s tiny signature in the 1927 Picture we saw earlier, to
create “correspondences,” to borrow Hugnet’s word, albeit inverted
ones, between the beholder’s closeness and the vastness of the
cosmic setting in which the figure of the ballerina appears (Jeffett,
88 and F.J.M. 1447a). Beneath the stone, the mirror, which as Miró’s
note on his preparatory drawing indicates, allows one to “see in all
directions and in all forms [or ways (formes)]” (F.J.M. 1447a)—returns to
the theme Miró opened in his Nude with Mirror almost fifteen years
earlier. The difference, though, would be that, rather than represent
the pictorial space as folded over or projected back over the turning
figure, Miró turns the projection outward. Thus, Miró uses the mirror
to displace the beholder’s point of view quite literally into the work.
Or, Miró displaces one point of view for the beholder into the work
via the mirror. He leaves another, equally important point of view
outside, close to the upper surface of the stone, straining into
celestial distance. In this, I see the literal turn accomplished—the
turn away from the metaphors and simple equations to which Leiris

and Hugnet referred. Rather than represent a figure or a space that
both faces us and turns away to continue our space into its fictional
distance, the 1932 object invites us close up to face the figure and
gaze into space but also to occupy a position within it, between its
legs, as it were, from which to see outward.
This is unlike Brunelleschi’s mirror, which determined a position for
its subject, in order to perform its demonstration and establish its
univocal truth. It is also unlike the witness of van Eyck’s painted
mirror, which affirmed van Eyck’s position for anyone, anywhere to
see. Miró’s perspective establishes two relations for the subject to
the world in the work of art—two incompatible positions. Miró offers
a double perspective, a twinned relation—two positions: one within
the space and one at a distance. Like the point of view of the child
grown up in us, it is our own and also one from which we are
distanced. This double perspective cannot be reduced to the
constructed situations of Brunelleschi or of minimalism or of Piper,
the art of the subject position. Nor does it offer the objective
witness of Panofsky’s van Eyck, left to depend, in the absence of
demonstration, on what Jacques Derrida called “effects of
signature” cut off from the demonstration of presence Brunelleschi’s
mirror affords (Derrida, 20).27 Rather, Miró’s object with its mirror
demonstrates the fact of and the inadequacy of presence, the
insufficiency of your—or anyone’s—subject position, to the task of
seeing, where seeing is taken to mean understanding a world, such as
the fictional world Miró offers. Miro’s object likewise holds out the
possibility that, if we will let go of both political projects—
demonstrating the presence of the subject and bearing witness to
the presence of the authority—we may find we see the world
together after all. Perhaps this means we would be wrong to see
Miró’s politics in his attachment to Catalan identity. Perhaps the
right approach would be something more like acknowledging Miró’s
embrace of Catalan identity and his paradoxical insistence that
intelligibility, such as paintings or any object of shared
understanding requires, depends on transcending one’s subject
position. Perhaps this is what Damisch had in mind when he called
surrealism’s own mode of perspective utopian (Damisch, 264-66).
Perhaps Miró’s is the politics of nowhere.
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